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RECENT D ECISIONS
As stated by the Supreme Court in an earlier decision,9 the Con-
gressional intent in enacting the legislation was to foster the distribu-
tion of employment opportunities among a greater number of indi-
viduals by making it costly for employers to work employees beyond
40 hours in any one week. The present decision supports this intent
and the firm stand which the courts have taken on overtime practices
has been retained. This policy will undoubtedly prove important in
the employment picture of the post-reconversion period.
E. M. F.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SOLICITING FORMER EMPLOYER'S CUS-
TOMERS.-Plaintiff sued to recover percentage of the profits allegedly
due him under a contract of employment to manage defendant's de-
partment store. He admitted that he was paid a salary but stated
that he had not received any of the percentage of the profits due him.
Defendant denied plaintiff's claim for a percentage of the profits and
set up several counterclaims. In the first counterclaim the defendant
asserted that plaintiff had obtained names of defendant's customers
during his period of employment and had solicited trade from them in
competition with his master for a company in which the plaintiff held
a financial interest. This counterclaim stated that by reason of such
misconduct, the plaintiff forfeited his right to retain the weekly wages
he received for his employment, which wages totalled $10,065. The
second counterclaim sought an injunction to prevent plaintiff from
using the information which he had obtained in the course of his
former employment. Plaintiff made a motion to dismiss defendant's
counterclaims as insufficient in law. The Supreme Court, New York
County, denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss and he appealed to the
Appellate Division, First Department. Held, order of Supreme Court
modified by striking out the counterclaims. Kleinfeld v. Roburn
Agewcies, -, App. Div. -, 60 N. Y. S. (2d) 485 (1st Dep't 1946).
As to the first counterclaim that, because of his misconduct,
plaintiff had forfeited the weekly wages he had received, defendant
did not assert that there was any special agreement on which he based
his claim for recovery of the wages already paid. The mere relation-
ship of master and servant is not enough to constitute the servant as
a fiduciary accountable for the wages he has received.' In the ab-"
sence of a special agreement rendering the employee liable for wages
received, an employer cannot recover back such wages or equivalent
drawings paid during a period of completed employment. 2 It would
9 Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 86
L/ed. 1682 (1942).
1 American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 211 Mass. 229, 97 N. E. 911 (1912).
2 Pease Piano Co. v. Taylor, 197 App. Div. 468, 189 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1st
Dep't 1921).
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seem that defendant might better have alleged damages suffered as a
result of plaintiff's breach of contract of employment.
As to the second counterclaim seeking an injunction, there was
claim made by defendant that there was an implied negative covenant
in the contract of employment, namely, that the plaintiff would not
use information obtained in the course of his employment after such
employment terminated. However, the covenant implied in a con-
tract of employment is that an employee may not gain knQwledge and
information of a trade secret, and then turn it to his own advantage
against his employer. 3 There is no question of a trade secret involved
in the present case. Plaintiff, it is true, obtained names of his em-
ployer's customers in the course of his employment. But this was
certainly no trade secret. This is no breach of a confidential relation-
ship because no secret was imparted to the plaintiff. The customers
were doing business openly at advertised locations. Had these cus-
tomers been varied individuals who were unadvertised and could be
reached only by personal contact, a different question would be pre-
sented.4 Such customers could be obtained only by use of informa-
tion an employee obtained in the course of his employment. It fur-
ther appears in the case at hand that plaintiff solicited only those
customers who were not only openly doing business at advertised
locations, but who were also doing business with competitors of the
defendant.
Can it be said that there is anything wrong in an employee trying
to better himself ? It has long been well settled that in the ordinary
agreement of employment, there is no implied contract by the em-
ployee not to solicit the customers of his former employer after the
termination of employment, and to that extent he may use information
obtained in his former position provided there is no breach of confi-
dence. 5 Thus, in order to succeed, the counterclaim must show con-
duct which exceeds the bounds of permissible competition. There
were no facts to evidence unconscionable conduct on the part of the
plaintiff. The customers' names were obtainable without resort to
any trickery. An employee cannot help acquiring knowledge in the
course of his employment, and it would be violative of fundamental
rights to hold that he must abandon all that he has learned on taking
employment elsewhere.
A. W. K. III.
3 Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N. Y. 1, 138 N. E. 485 (1924).
4 People's Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co. v. Light, 171 App. Div. 671,
157 N. Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't 1916), aff'd, 224 N. Y. 727, 121 N. E. 886 (1918).
5 Scott & Co., Inc. v. Scott, 186 App. Div. 518, 174 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1st
Dep't 1919).
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